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The heart of Fodor's argument, then, involves the individuation of causal powers. And, as Fodor notes, the importance of this issue goes beyond the issue of individualism in psychology: 'Getting some of this stuff sorted out may... be of use to metaphysics and the philosophy of science, even if it leaves things more or less unaltered in semantics and the philosophy of mind' (p. 7).
One might well be tempted to support individualism by arguing that only intrinsic or non-relational properties could serve as causal powers to individuate natural kinds in science. But Fodor explicitly disavows any such strategy; in fact, he takes it as part of his task to accommodate the legitimacy of certain clearly relational kinds which are recognized by practicing scientists, such as meteors and planets. This makes Fodor's account particularly interesting. If the account could show that my twin and I share all of our psychological causal powers, yet did not show this simply on the basis of the fact that we share all of our non-relational properties, it would, I think, be very likely to yield results whose interest went well beyond the issue of psychological individualism.
On Fodor's account, causal powers are individuated by their effects in the domain of the relevant science. Roughly: my twin and I will have different psychological causal powers only if our different environmental connections are responsible for some difference in our psychological properties. Moreover, Fodor notes, with a nod to Hume, that 'your causal powers are a function of your contingent connections, not of your conceptual connections' (p. 19). He proposes, as a first approximation, the following necessary condition on distinctness of causal powers: for two properties to be distinct causal powers, the difference between them must be responsible for a difference in effect, and it must not be a merely conceptual truth that this difference in causal powers is responsible for this difference in effects. ' We are now, says Fodor, in a position to distinguish between properties like being a planet on the one hand, and being waterconnected on the other. Ceterisparibus, a planet will have a Keplerian orbit, while a molecular duplicate that is not a planet will not. Planethood, then is responsible for this difference, and it is a contingent fact that this is so (i.e., it is a contingent fact that planets have Keplerian orbits at all). But according to Fodor, 'it is conceptually necessary that if you are connected to water in the right way then you have water thoughts (rather than twater thoughts) ... To have a water thought just is to have a thought that is connected to water in the right way' (pp. 21-1). Thus planethood, but not water-connectedness, tulfills the necessary condition for being a causal power in its science. ' The existence of any important distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual truths has not, of course, been uncontroversial in post-positivist thought; but I will accept it uncritically here. Unfortunately, constructing various test sentences parallel to the ones offered by Fodor yields no such result. Let us begin by constructing a new test sentence for Case 2, in a way that parallels the way TS1 is constructed from Case 1.
TS2' If having a Keplerian orbit is a property that celestial
bodies (other than comets, meteors, and satellites) that revolve around stars have, then, if I am a planet, I have a Keplerian orbit. As in TS1, the consequent of TS2' is a conditional relating the two properties that figure in the relevant Case. As in TS1, the antecedent describes a relationship between the 'effect' property in the relevant Case and a new property, one not mentioned in the Case. But clearly, TS2' is every bit as conceptually necessary as TSI, since being a planet just is' being a celestial body (other than a comet, meteor, or satellite) that revolves around a star.2 So TS1 and TS2' provide no way of distinguishing between Case 1 and Case 2.
It might be thought here that this parallel between TSI and TS2' is not really relevant. Perhaps it doesn't matter that the connection described in Case 2 can be seen as conceptual. Maybe the point is that the connection described in Case 1 can only be seen as conceptual. Perhaps an asymmetry will be revealed in our inability to construct a contingent test sentence for Case 1, parallel to our contingent TS2 for Case 2.
A little experimentation on the model of TS2, however, reveals no such asymmetry. Consider, for example: 
